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*5 POLICE PROSECUTION IN RHODE ISLAND: THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 
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Copyright © 2006 by Andrew Horwitz, Esq, John R. Grasso 
Every day in Rhode Island, police officers are practicing law without a license in both 
the District Court and the Traffic Tribunal. They do so with the full stamp of approval of 
the judges before whom they appear, despite the fact that the unauthorized practice of 
law is a crime in Rhode Island, as it is in every other state in the country. While one can 
certainly speculate about reasons why this practice has developed, there is nothing in any 
published decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island or in any state statute that 
appears to permit or justify it. And, although the vast majority of police prosecutors in 
Rhode Island are dedicated and highly qualified public servants who do their jobs in good 
faith and to the best of their abilities, the fact remains that it is a highly problematic 
practice to allow police officers, who are not licensed attorneys, to prosecute criminal and 
traffic cases. After first explaining the various ways in which police officers routinely 
engage in the unauthorized practice of law in the District Court and the Traffic Tribunal, 
the authors explore a few of the many reasons why this unlawful practice is simply bad 
public policy. 
At the outset, it is important to recognize the vital role a public prosecutor plays in 
protecting the public, the defendant, and the criminal justice system as a whole. While it 
may seem superficially harmless to entrust a misdemeanor or traffic prosecution to a 
police officer, that delegation of responsibility completely ignores the prosecutor's vital 
role. A prosecutor exercises enormous discretion -- discretion that is essentially 
unreviewed and unreviewable -- in handling criminal or traffic cases. The proper exercise 
of that discretion is dependent upon a number of factors, not the least of which include 
legal training and ethical obligations. Indeed, the criminal justice system functions almost 
entirely on a presumption that the extraordinary power of the government, as wielded 
through a prosecutor, is being applied fairly and justly. This presumption is founded on 
the fact that the prosecutor is an attorney who, having been licensed to practice law in 
the jurisdiction, is fully trained in the law and bound by the code of legal ethics governing 
attorney conduct. The licensing process also assures a prosecuting attorney has passed a 
screening with respect to honor and integrity and that he or she has sworn obedience to 
a code of legal ethics. The fact that a prosecuting attorney is subject to the threat of 
professional discipline if he or she violates any of the relevant ethical obligations, 
provides further assurance that a prosecuting attorney will faithfully execute the duties of 
his or her office in a fair and just fashion. When the person who prosecutes a criminal or 
traffic case is not a licensed attorney, none of these protections or assurances is in place, 
and the legal presumption that prosecutorial discretion is being exercised fairly is entirely 
unfounded. 
The following points detail some of the many reasons why, even if one were to 
assume that a prosecuting police officer were as legally competent as a prosecuting 
attorney and as obedient to all of a prosecuting attorney's ethical requirements, several 
troubling issues still remain. In Rhode Island, we elect an Attorney General to carry out 
the prosecutorial function for the State. As our duly elected public prosecutor, he or she 
is charged with the responsibility of prioritizing the use of prosecution resources and 
determining fairness on an individualized basis. Ultimately, he or she is answerable to the 
electorate. The public prosecutor's failure to perform these roles, either directly or 
through his or her staff, constitutes an entirely unjustified delegation to an individual 
police department that is not directly accountable in any fashion. Moreover, there are 
problems in terms of the appearance of justice in courts in which police officers serve as 
prosecutors. When a prosecuting attorney fails to appear to prosecute a criminal case, 
the message conveyed is the case is not of any particular importance -- certainly not the 
message our criminal justice system ought to be conveying. By failing to distinguish 
between the functions of the police department and the functions of a prosecutor's office, 
the practice suggests the existence of an unsupervised police state. In addition, allowing 
a layperson to practice law, an act that is illegal in every state in the country, the practice 
condones illegality at the same time that it purports to be enforcing the law. 
 
Daily Practice in the District Court and the Traffic Tribunal 
On any given morning in the Rhode Island District Court, dozens and sometimes 
hundreds of criminal defendants are arraigned on criminal charges. In each of those 
cases, the defendant is arraigned on a criminal complaint that has been drafted by a 
police officer, not by a licensed attorney. [FN1] Prior to the arraignment, particularly in 
misdemeanor cases, there is typically some conversation or negotiation that takes place 
between the prosecuting police officer and the defendant's lawyer or, much more 
frequently, the unrepresented defendant. At the arraignment, the government is 
represented by a police officer, not a licensed attorney, and in the case of misdemeanor 
offenses, the case is frequently resolved with some sort of a plea. The Court will generally 
ask the police prosecutor for a sentencing recommendation or, if the case is not resolved, 
for *6 a recommendation with respect to bail. Those recommendations are made without 
any input from a licensed attorney. If a misdemeanor case is not resolved, it is scheduled 
for a pre-trial conference date. On that date, depending upon the city or town 
prosecuting the case, it is quite likely that the government will once again be represented 
in the negotiation phase and before the Court by a police prosecutor who is not licensed 
to practice law. In some settings, that representation occurs under some form of 
supervision by a licensed attorney, but frequently that is not the case. In many cities and 
towns, a licensed attorney will review the case if, and only if, the case is scheduled for 
trial. Under current practice in District Court, police prosecutors who are not duly licensed 
to practice law are not permitted to represent the government at trial. 
The situation is similar at the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal, with the notable 
exception of what occurs at the trial stage. As in District Court, the case is initiated with a 
summons drafted by a police officer who is not licensed to practice law. The government 
is represented by a police officer at the arraignment stage, not only for purposes of 
appearing before the court, but also for purposes of negotiating dispositions with 
unrepresented defendants and with defense counsel. If the case is passed for trial, with 
the exception of chemical test refusal cases, which are prosecuted at trial by the 
Department of the Attorney General, the government will be represented by the 
individual police officer who wrote the summons. That officer will generally be permitted 
not only to testify, but also to cross-examine defense witnesses, make arguments to the 
court, and make sentencing recommendations if a charge is sustained. If, as frequently 
occurs, the defendant is not represented by counsel, the trial proceeds and concludes 
without a licensed attorney ever having looked at the case. 
 
What Constitutes the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
As the Supreme Court of Rhode Island noted in 1935 “[that] the practice of law is a 
special field reserved to lawyers duly licensed by the court, no one denies.” [FN2] 
Although “the definition of the practice of law and the determination concerning who may 
practice law is exclusively within the province” of the Supreme Court, 
legislature clearly has the power to “declare acts of unauthorized practice of law illegal 
and punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both.” [FN4] In General Laws Title 11, 
Chapter 27, the legislature has done just that. Rhode Island General Laws § 11-27-5 
provides that “No person, except a duly admitted member of the bar of this state, whose 
authority as a member to practice law is in full force and effect, shall practice law in this 
state.” [FN5] For purposes of enforcing that statute, General Laws § 11-27-2 provides a 
statutory definition of the practice of law; that definition includes “the preparation of 
pleadings or other legal papers incident to any action or other proceeding of any kind 
before or to be brought before the court,” [FN6] “acting as a representative or on behalf 
of another person to commence, settle, compromise, adjust, or dispose of any civil or 
criminal case,” [FN7] and acting as a “representative of another person before any 
court.” [FN8] Rhode Island General Laws § 11-27-14 provides the penalty provision for 
any violation of the statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law, permitting a 
sentence of up to one year in prison for a first offense and making a second offense a 
felony. [FN9] 
*7 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island maintains a separate and distinct authority to 
enforce the prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law and, for purposes of 
enforcement, the Court has set out its own definition of the practice of law. Although it 
has stated that the practice of law “is difficult to define,” [FN10] the Court has adopted 
the following language from the Supreme Court of South Carolina: “‘It is too obvious for 
discussion that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in courts. 
According to the generally understood definition of the practice of law in this country, it 
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special 
proceedings, and the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients 
before judges and courts, ... and, in general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for 
them in matters connected with the law.”’ [FN11] Additionally, in 1983, the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island published guidelines for the use of legal assistants that help 
elucidate its perspective on what does and does not constitute the practice of law. [FN12] 
As a general matter, these guidelines prohibit the delegation to a non-attorney of 
“[s]ervices requiring the exercise of independent professional legal judgment.” [FN13] 
Clearly, drafting a charging instrument and submitting that charging instrument to a 
court each constitute a violation of General Laws § 11-27-5. The drafting process involves 
“the preparation of pleadings or other legal papers incident to any action or other 
proceeding of any kind before or to be brought before the court,” an act that is squarely 
within the statutory definition of the practice of law contained in General Laws § 11-27-
2(1). Once the charging instrument is submitted to the court, the person doing so has 
commenced the case, an act that General Laws § 11-27-2(3) explicitly defines as the 
practice of law. Similarly, the Supreme Court's definition of the practice of law includes 
“the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special 
proceedings ... before judges and courts.” [FN14] Presumably, for that reason, in its 
guidelines for the use of legal assistants the Supreme Court requires all legal documents 
be “reviewed by a lawyer before being submitted to a client or another party.” [FN15] 
The charging instrument used in the arraignment of a criminal or traffic case, much 
like the complaint in a civil action, is a pivotal document that can determine the entire 
nature of the following proceedings. As one noted criminal law professor has observed, 
“our system is one in which guilty pleas routinely follow a charge and, therefore, the 
decision to charge is, in many cases, tantamount to conviction.” [FN16] Consequently, 
and particularly because of the many intricate legal questions within the charging 
decision, it *9 makes perfect sense to require the charging instrument be drafted, or at 
least approved, by a person who is licensed to practice law. At a bare minimum, the 
decision to charge, and what offense or offenses to charge, involves a detailed knowledge 
of the elements of the available offenses and any potential defenses to those offenses. 
Moreover, because an offense should not be charged unless there is sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of probable cause and sufficient admissible evidence to support a 
conviction, [FN17] the charging decision, reflected in the drafting and submission of a 
charging instrument, plainly requires “the exercise of independent professional legal 
judgment” that the Supreme Court says is solely a lawyer's job. [FN18] 
As clear as it is that the drafting and submission of the charging instrument 
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, the law, representing the government's 
interests in a plea negotiation, is that much clearer. General Laws § 11-27-2(3) explicitly 
provides that “acting as a representative or on behalf of another person to commence, 
settle, compromise, adjust, or dispose of any civil or criminal case” constitutes the 
practice of law. This is, of course, as it should be. As the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina opined recently, “The non-attorney's negotiation of guilty pleas with defendants 
and defense counsel clearly crosses the line into the unauthorized practice of law. Plea 
negotiations require the training, skill and accountability of an attorney.” [FN19] 
When the plea negotiation takes place with the unrepresented defendant, as is most 
often the case in the District Court arraignment courtroom and almost exclusively the 
case in the Traffic Tribunal, another aspect of the practice of law comes into play: the 
provision of legal advice. While it may be theoretically possible to engage in a plea 
negotiation without offering legal advice, it is virtually impossible to imagine. Any effort 
on the part of the police prosecutor to discuss the evidence in the case, the likelihood of 
conviction, and possible sentencing consequences of a conviction after trial or the wisdom 
of entering a plea, must fairly be characterized as the giving of legal advice. [FN20] 
Because General Laws § 11-27-2(2) defines the provision of “any advice or counsel 
pertaining to a law question or a court action or judicial proceeding” as the practice of 
law, a police officer engaged in the negotiation of a criminal or traffic charge will 
invariably be practicing law. 
When a police officer appears in open court as the government's representative, 
whether for the purpose of resolving a case or simply for the purpose of arraigning a 
defendant on a new charge, that police officer is engaged in the practice of law. The 
statutory definition of the practice of law includes acting as a “representative of another 
person before any court” [FN21] and “acting as a representative or on behalf of another 
person to commence, settle, compromise, adjust, or dispose of any civil or criminal case.” 
[FN22] Each of these things happens at every single arraignment in the District Court and 
at the Traffic Tribunal. The Supreme Court's definition of the practice of law encompasses 
“the management of ... actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and 
courts.” [FN23] Making plea offers, presenting facts, and making recommendations with 
respect to sentencing and to bail, are all part and parcel of the police prosecutor's daily 
activities in the District Court. At those times, the Court calls upon the police prosecutor 
to make legal arguments. Each of these activities falls squarely within any reasonable 
definition of “management” of the case before the court. 
Rule 6(a) of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, which governs the arraignment 
stage, provides the “police department which charged the summons shall be represented 
by a prosecution officer.” Because these rules are subject to the approval of the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island, one might wonder whether the Court has somehow authorized 
police officers, who are not licensed to practice law, to engage in these various activities. 
In fact, such a conclusion seems very *29 much at odds with the court's recent case law. 
The Traffic Tribunal rules offer no definition whatsoever of the term “prosecution officer,” 
so it is not at all clear the term refers to a police officer who is not licensed to practice 
law. Similarly, the rules offer no description of the specific tasks that may or may not be 
undertaken by a “prosecution officer.” Nothing in the requirement that the charging 
police department be “represented” by a “prosecution officer” inherently means that a 
police officer, who is not licensed to practice law, is suddenly permitted to engage in 
charging decisions, plea negotiations, and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Nor, 
does the requirement that a “prosecution officer” represent the charging department 
inherently mean that such a person must exclusively represent the department. Indeed, 
nothing in the rules suggests that charging decisions, plea negotiations, and the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion cannot, and should not, be reserved for attorneys duly licensed 
to practice law. 
When the Supreme Court first upheld the Constitutional validity of the precursor to 
General Laws Title 11, Chapter 27, it explicitly confirmed the Legislature's power to 
criminalize acts that the Legislature defines as the unauthorized practice of law. In 
Creditors' Service Corp. v. Cummings, [FN24] the Court recognized the Legislature 
“has the inherent power to prohibit and punish any act as a crime, provided that in 
exercising such power it does not violate any provision of the Federal or State 
Constitution .... If the statute is within the power of the Legislature to enact, it is the duty 
of the court to sustain it, irrespective of its own opinion of the wisdom, reasonableness, 
or necessity for the statute.” [FN25] Thus, while the Legislature clearly “has no power to 
pass a law granting the right to any one to practice law,” the Court noted the Legislature 
does have the power to “enact a statute designed to protect the public against 
imposition, incompetency, and dishonesty.” [FN26] 
Much more recently, in 2002, the Court reasserted its strong support for the 
Legislature's independent right to protect the public against the unauthorized practice of 
law. In In re Rule Amendments to Rules 5.4(a) and 7.2(c) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, [FN27] the Court considered and rejected a proposed rule 
change that would have conflicted with portions of the Legislature's unauthorized practice 
statute. Although General Laws § 8-6-2(a) explicitly provides that rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court “shall supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith,” the Court 
expressed, in no uncertain terms, its reluctance to create such a conflict with the 
unauthorized practice statute: “As a matter of comity, we believe this Court should avoid 
enacting rules that would conflict with the Legislature's policy determinations in this 
area.” [FN28] Although not a single party testified against the proposed rule changes, 
which had been put forward by the Ethics Advisory Panel and supported by the Rhode 
Island Bar Association, the Court ultimately rejected the proposal because adopting it 
would have put the Court rules “at variance with the public policy of the General 
Assembly and condone [d] conduct [that has been] declared to be criminal by the 
General Assembly.” [FN29] In light of this vigorous protection of the Legislature's efforts 
to prevent the unauthorized practice of law, it seems hard to imagine that by approving 
just one sentence in Traffic Tribunal Rule 6(a) -- and a highly ambiguous sentence 
containing undefined terms at that -- the Court intended to completely undermine 
General Laws § 11-27-5. 
Whatever limited protection Rule *30 6(a) may arguably provide to a prosecuting 
police officer at the arraignment stage at the Traffic Tribunal, there is certainly no parallel 
rule concerning the arraignment stage in the District Court. And even at the Traffic 
Tribunal, the rule is limited by its terms to the arraignment stage. When a police officer 
prosecutes a Traffic Tribunal case at trial, which is generally the case unless the 
defendant is charged with refusing a chemical test, the unauthorized practice of law is too 
transparent to require significant exploration. Beyond the practice issues previously 
described and inherent in representing the government in open court, no plausible 
definition of the practice of law could exclude cross-examining witnesses and making 
legal arguments to the court. 
 
Why Police Prosecution Should Be Prohibited [FN30] 
A prosecutor in the American legal system is vested with an enormous amount of 
discretion in the handling of a criminal case. In the vast majority of situations, that 
discretion is exercised at early stages in a prosecution in ways that cannot and will not 
ever be reviewed, either by the judiciary or by anyone else. Most obviously, the basic 
decision to charge a person with a crime and the secondary decision of what charge or 
charges to file are almost entirely beyond any form of review. Any of a multitude of pre-
trial decisions, including bail requests, discovery, and plea negotiations, are similarly 
outside the scope of any effective review. The United States Supreme Court has noted 
that most prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves readily to judicial review and, 
except for some very narrow exceptions, should remain beyond the scope of judicial 
review for broader policy reasons. [FN31] Consequently, the criminal justice system 
functions largely on a tremendous leap of faith that those who wield the government's 
prosecutorial power will wield it in a fair and just fashion. In large part, this leap of faith 
is justified by the prosecutor's legal training, by the prosecutor's oath of obedience to a 
binding code of legal ethics, and by the fact that the prosecutor, at least on the state 
level, is an elected official who is expected to be responsive to the electorate. 
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court made explicit the general rule that courts 
had consistently followed for years when issues had arisen concerning the prosecution of 
a criminal case: that prosecutors' decisions are supported by a *31 “‘presumption of 
regularity”’ such that “‘in the absence of any clear evidence to the contrary, courts 
[should] presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.”’ [FN32] In that 
case, which involved a claim of selective prosecution, the Court stressed the need for 
broad judicial deference to prosecutorial judgments. Because it wished to avoid judicial 
interference with the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the Court held that a 
defendant must present clear evidence of a violation “[i]n order to dispel the presumption 
that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection.” [FN33] Simple logic suggests that a 
presumption of regularity cannot apply when there is no assurance the prosecutor has 
ever expressed the willingness and ability to abide by ethical rules, or that the prosecutor 
has any legal training or competence whatsoever. 
Because our entire legal system is designed around the presumption of regularity, it 
is critically important that only those licensed to practice law are permitted to exercise 
the vast powers of the prosecutor. While it may well be that many police officers perform 
the prosecutorial function both ethically and effectively, this misses the point that there 
must be clear and consistent guidelines in place to protect the public, the defendant, and 
the very integrity of the system. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has made this point 
on more than one occasion: “To safeguard the practice of law, which touches so 
intimately the administration of justice, and to promote the welfare of the people, whose 
ministers we are, this Court has ordained certain standards of character and education as 
a prerequisite to admission to the bar. These standards are high, as indeed they ought to 
be, and there is constant pressure to elevate them still higher, all to the end that the 
people may be assured the best possible service in the dispatch of their legal business.” 
[FN34] The Court adheres to these standards because, it has noted, “Great and 
irreparable injury can come to the people, and the proper administration of justice can be 
prevented, by the unwarranted intrusion of unauthorized and unskilled persons into the 
practice of law.” [FN35] 
Because the prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law has been justified largely 
in terms of protecting the putative client and society at large from the unscrupulous or 
incompetent practitioner, the fact that an individual police prosecutor may be acting in an 
ethical and competent*32 fashion is largely beside the point. The general prohibition 
should hold for the greater good of society. It is hard to imagine a context in which more 
harm might be done to an individual or to society as a whole than to entrust the 
enormous power of the criminal justice system to one who is engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law; consequently, it is hard to imagine a context in which the 
general prohibition should be more rigorously enforced. 
One fundamental characteristic of the American system of justice is that both the 
public and the accused are entitled to the fair and prudent exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. As the commentary to the American Bar Association's Prosecution Function 
Standards notes “The character, quality and efficiency of the whole system is shaped in 
great measure by the manner in which the prosecutor exercises his or her broad 
discretionary powers.” [FN36] The fair and prudent exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
turns, in large part, on obedience to an attorney's code of legal ethics. If the person 
acting as prosecutor is making discretionary decisions without the guidance and 
restrictions provided by an attorney's ethical rules, both the public and the accused are 
deprived of the fair exercise of discretion that an attorney would provide and that the law 
commands. 
On a very basic level, both the public and the accused rely heavily on the fact that, as 
the United States Supreme Court has noted, “It is as much [a prosecutor's] duty to 
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use 
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” [FN37] In a wide variety of settings, 
beginning with the decision to charge and including pre-trial discovery, plea negotiations, 
and trial, the public and the accused are forced to rely quite heavily on the ethical 
obligations on a prosecutor to seek “justice,” not just a desired end result. [FN38] 
Exculpatory evidence in the hands of a prosecutor will generally find its way to a criminal 
defendant if, and only if, the prosecutor obeys his or her ethical and constitutional duties 
in the face of any number of competing interests. A plea negotiation is founded upon the 
fact that the defense can rely on factual representations made by a prosecutor who is 
faithful to his or her constitutionally and ethically prescribed role in the face of any 
number of competing interests. In each of these areas, and in countless others 
throughout the criminal process, *33 both the public and a defendant must rely on the 
good faith of the prosecutor to protect his or her rights. Any notion that a judge is 
capable of monitoring the prosecutor's conduct in order to ensure that no ethical or 
constitutional violations occur is both inconsistent with the conclusion reached by the 
United States Supreme Court [FN39] and simply incorrect. 
Because the charging decision is the “part of the prosecutor's discretion which carries 
with it the greatest potential for misuse,” [FN40] the reliance on a police prosecutor at 
that stage of a prosecution is particularly inappropriate. As a general matter, a 
prosecutor's natural inclination, exacerbated when left unchecked by any obligation to an 
ethical code or any prospect of sanction for doing so, is to overcharge. The police 
prosecutor will generally feel more protected by overcharging, as the cost of any error 
will be borne by the criminal defendant. However, it is clear that a police prosecutor is 
much more likely to be subject to certain kinds of institutional biases than a prosecuting 
attorney. In any number of cases, the arresting officer may be in some jeopardy 
concerning allegations of police brutality, false arrest, or various other violations of an 
individual's rights. One way of providing greater protection for the arresting officer is for 
a fellow officer -- the police prosecutor -- to ensure criminal charges are filed, because a 
case that never makes it through the charging stage puts the officer in a much worse 
posture in terms of civil or criminal litigation. If a prosecuting officer recognizes that 
some evidence was gathered in an illegal fashion, there is an enormous disincentive for 
the officer to acknowledge the illegality, particularly if doing so means refusing to file 
charges. Not only would the prosecuting officer risk engendering tremendous resentment 
from an officer upon whom he or she is likely to have to rely in the future, but the 
prosecuting officer also risks setting up a colleague for the possibility of internal review or 
potential litigation. This sort of behavior violates what has frequently been described as 
one of the central maxims of police culture: protect your fellow officers at all costs. 
[FN41] The far easier path for the police prosecutor is to charge the individual and then 
use the prosecutorial power to resolve the case quickly. 
Yet another form of bias arises when the victim of the alleged crime is a police officer 
or the police department. When an officer arrests someone for assaulting him or her or 
resisting arrest, a fellow police officer asked to prosecute the case is not likely to view it 
in the same fashion as an attorney without any personal connection to the case. While a 
prosecuting attorney must recuse himself or herself from a case in which he or she has a 
conflict of interest, a police prosecutor is not *34 bound by any similar rule. 
Of course, it is also possible that these same sorts of biases can cut in the opposite 
direction, leaving society poorly protected when a case is either not charged at all or is 
seriously undercharged. Whether caused by the urge to protect a fellow police officer, an 
effort to avoid litigation that might expose unseemly or unlawful police practices, or an 
effort to preserve a city's crime statistics by underreporting serious criminal activity, the 
absence of any ethical parameters around these vital prosecutorial decisions leaves the 
public in jeopardy. 
In the final analysis, even if one were to assume that a prosecuting police officer were 
as legally competent as a prosecuting attorney and as obedient to all of a prosecuting 
attorney's ethical requirements, the practice of police prosecution is simply bad public 
policy. Allowing a case to be prosecuted by a person who is neither licensed to practice 
law nor bound by any specific code of ethical behavior certainly serves to undermine the 
appearance of fairness in the operation of our system of justice. The situation is that 
much worse when the unlicensed prosecutor is a member of the arresting police 
department. Forcing a person who has been arrested by a particular police department to 
rely on a member of that same department to exercise prosecutorial discretion, evaluate 
the legality of the police actions in the case, evaluate the legal strength of the 
prosecution's case, evaluate the worth of the case in terms of its deterrent value, provide 
the accused with exculpatory evidence, and, in the Traffic Tribunal, even try the case, 
would certainly cause most defendants to question the fundamental integrity of the 
proceedings. 
It might be tempting for some to justify the practice on economic grounds, 
suggesting that what transpires in the District Court and the Traffic Tribunal is not that 
important. Those who would take such an approach grossly underestimate two significant 
factors. First, they underestimate the significance of a criminal prosecution. Even if the 
underlying offense is perceived as relatively trivial, a criminal conviction can, in certain 
circumstances, cost a person a job, an apartment in public housing, a professional 
license, a driver's license, the right to remain in the United States and, of course, 
freedom from incarceration. Second, they underestimate the significance of the public's 
perception of our justice system. The District Court and the Traffic Tribunal, in which the 
practice of police prosecution is prevalent, are the primary point of contact, if not the 
only point of contact, most citizens ever have with the system. For just this reason, 
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the late Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 
repeatedly expressed the viewpoint that the lower courts are the “most important” courts 
in the state. [FN42] 
While any instance in which the public is left unprotected against the unauthorized 
practice of law is certainly cause for concern, it is that much worse when the unlicensed 
practitioner purports to actually represent the public through his or her unlawful activity. 
Condoning illegal activity conducted in the name of the state is hard to justify under any 
circumstances, but even more so when the state is engaged in the process of attempting 
to enforce and engender respect for the law. In the most obvious sense, the prosecution 
of a criminal case in a fashion that involves unlawful action by the state engenders 
tremendous disrespect for the law. The words of the great Supreme Court Justice Louis 
D. Brandeis ring just as true today as when he wrote them in 1928: 
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials *35 shall be 
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a 
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe 
the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good 
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the 
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man 
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of 
the criminal law the end justifies the means -- to declare that the government may 
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal -- would bring 
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its 
face. [FN43] 
[FNa1]. Andrew Horwitz is a Professor of Law and the Director of Clinical Programs at 
Roger Williams University School of Law. John R. Grasso is a former police officer with the 
Cranston Police Department and a third year law student at Roger Williams University 
School of Law. 
 
[FN1]. There are some situations in which the police officer who drafts the complaint or 
who appears in court as a police prosecutor is also an attorney duly licensed to practice 
law in Rhode Island. This article is intended to address the more typical situation in which 
that is not the case. 
 
[FN2]. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. 139, 140 (R.I. 1935). 
 
[FN3]. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Dep't of Workers' Comp., 543 A.2d 
662, 664 (R.I. 1988). 
 
[FN4]. Id. at 141. 
 
[FN5]. RI Gen. Laws § 11-27-5. 
 
[FN6]. RI Gen. Laws § 11-27-2(1). 
 
[FN7]. RI Gen. Laws § 11-27-2(3). 
 
[FN8]. RI Gen. Laws § 11-27-2(1). 
 
[FN9]. RI Gen. Laws § 11-27-14. 
 
[FN10]. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. at 140. 
 
[FN11]. Id. at 144 (quoting In re Duncan, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (S.C. 1909)). 
 
[FN12]. See Provisional Order No. 18, 454 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1983). 
 
[FN13]. Id. at 1223. 
 
[FN14]. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. at 145. 
 
[FN15]. Provisional Order No. 18, 454 A.2d at 1222. 
 
[FN16]. John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney -- New Answers 
to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 308 (1980). 
 
[FN17]. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.9(A) (3d Ed. 1993) 
[Hereinafter A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS]; R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
3.8(A). 
 
[FN18]. Provisional Order No. 18, 454 A.2d at 1223. 
 
[FN19]. In re Lexington County Transfer Ct., 512 S.E.2d 791, 793 (S.C. 1999). 
 
[FN20]. See Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of 
Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 93-101 
(1997). 
 
[FN21]. RI Gen. Laws § 11-27-2(1). 
 
[FN22]. RI Gen. Laws § 11-27-2(3). 
 
[FN23]. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. at 144 (quoting In re Duncan, 65 S.E. at 211). 
 
[FN24]. 190 A. 2 (R.I. 1937). 
 
[FN25]. Id. at 8. 
 
[FN26]. Id. 
 
[FN27]. 815 A.2d 47 (R.I. 2002). 
 
[FN28]. Id. at 49. 
 
[FN29]. Id. at 48, 50. 
 
[FN30]. The arguments presented in this section, along with many others, are developed 
in much greater detail in Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop Out of Copping a Plea: 
Eradicating Police Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305 (1998). 
 
[FN31]. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S 598, 607-08 (1985). 
 
[FN32]. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v. 
Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)). 
 
[FN33]. Id. at 467. 
 
[FN34]. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 179 A. at 146-47. 
 
[FN35]. Id. at 143. 
 
[FN36]. A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2 cmt. 
 
[FN37]. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 
[FN38]. A.B.A. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2. 
 
[FN39]. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987) 
(reversing a conviction obtained by a prosecutor with a conflict of interest, noting the 
wide array of prosecutorial decisions that are “critical to the conduct of a prosecution” yet 
are “made outside the supervision of the court”). 
 
[FN40]. Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 532, 537 (1970). 
 
[FN41]. See, e.g., Lawrence Sherman, Learning Police Ethics, CRIM JUST. ETHICS, 
Winter/Spring 1982, at 10, 15. 
 
[FN42]. See, e.g., Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Municipal Court -- The Most Important 
Court in New Jersey: Its Remarkable Progress and its Unsolved Problems, 10 
RUTGERS L. REV. 647, 650 (1956). 
 
[FN43]. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 
 
 
 
54-JUN RIBJ 5 
 
END OF DOCUMENT 
 
 
